Physical theories distinguish two notions of time: reversible, homogeneous parameter time (relativity theory and quantum mechanics) and irreversible, directed time (thermodynamics). Both concepts differ fundamentally from what we define implicitly by using the tenses and temporal adverbs in language. The tempora past, present, and future hinge upon one uniquely exposed moment: the now. The now is the moment of actuality in the process of subjective awareness.
It proceeds spontaneously and irresistibly in relation to all datable points of time.
Without reference to the moving now, past and future only denote directions in time. But there is no physical definition of the now. Physical time, be it reversible or irreversible, differs from subjectively experienced time in that it is atemporal.
Because physics has no notion of the now it cannot genuinely treat past and future as temporal regions. As a physicist, Einstein consistently declared the division of time into these regions as illusory. In the first two sections of this paper we reaffirm that Einstein was right on logical grounds. In the third section, however, we insist that the actuality of the now and its movement are truths that logical reason has not the power to question. In the fourth section we shall be looking for a clue to escape the dilemma.
Physical Time
Relativity theory dispelled the notion of absolute simultaneity, which was inherent in the view of an objective, independently definable now. If Unsynchronized nows unequivocally belong to different worlds. Thus, temporality splits the universe into as many worlds as there are locations possibly occupied by observers. Einstein's dictum states that this multitude is only subjective and illusory.
Compared with this recent argument there is an age-old one giving rise to a similar conclusion. In the third century B.C., Zeno of Elea set out his riddles of motion which, after a long history of futile efforts to solve them, proved to originate in our notion of the now. Achilles cannot come abreast of the tortoise, the runner in the stadium cannot get started, the arrow must stand still in the air, because for any spatial distance to be traversed there is an infinity of subdistances to be passed. Since each distance, however small, can be subdivided without limit there is an infinity of acts, so the argument, necessary to overcome it. The duration of an infinite number of acts, irrespective of their lengths, always adds to eternity. Thus, motion is impossible.
Zeno's paradoxes deal with a crucial feature of the physical definition of time.
Newtonian physics, relativity theory, and standard quantum mechanics all assume that both space and time are continuous as opposed to discrete 1 . By assuming that time is a linear mathematical continuum of instants, physics asserts a time interval to be a dense set of an infinite number of elements.
Although it was never seriously questioned that a dense set of spatial elements may add to finite length, it was fiercely debated whether time can be expressed by a dense continuum of numbers 2 . How, this is the question raised by Zeno's 1Standard quantum theory has discretized several physical variables whose counterparts in classical physics were mathematically continuous, but space and time remained continuous. In standard quantum theory, every point in continuous space is a potential position of, say, an electron, and every instant of a continuous time is the potential time of a physical event. For a detailed discussion of standard quantum mechanics in its bearing on Zeno's paradoxes see Grünbaum [1] , ch. II, § 6. paradoxes, can an infinite number of temporal instants be contained in a stretch of finite length?
Perplexing as this question in fact is, it is also astonishing that it was not settled before the mid of our own century. To my knowledge, it was Adolf Grünbaum [1] who first showed that our tacit association of temporal instants with instants being possibly now is the main reason generating the paradox. The now in fact cannot be thought of as an infinitesimally brief instant. The now as the instant of actuality has a positive, non-vanishing, finite duration. An infinitesimally short duration of the now would cause actuality to vanish. For us as conscious beings, the now is of perceivable duration. First, the temporal resolution of sensory awareness is limited. The smallest unit of time perception is about 30 milliseconds. Below 30 ms perception of the sequence of stimuli, below a somewhat smaller interval (varying with modality) perception of differences as such come to an end. Second, the now as the unit of duration that is experienced as one whole may last up to a few seconds 3 .
Of course, time as a dense set of an infinite number of elements is not constituted by units of this kind. The now itself is not a primitive but a complex concept. It is composed of up to approximately a hundred units of elementary length. Thus, time, as we subjectively perceive it, is quite different from a linear mathematical continuum of instants. Zeno's paradoxes result from not distinguishing these different concepts properly. In this respect, they are proofs of the basic incompatibility of the physical and psychological concepts of time.
Grünbaum's resolution of the paradoxes demonstrates that there is a radical and irreducible dissimilarity between time and temporality.
What about the concept of an objective, independently definable now, however? We have already touched upon the problem of such a notion. The distinction of past, present, and future as such leaves only what is present as actually existent. Physics usually conceives of the now only as a punctual event or as a point on the time axis. If the present were itself lasting, it would consist of distinguishable earlier and later parts. One and the same now would then include instants just-still-future and just-already-passed. A punctual present, however, has no duration and hence no measurable extension. The reduction of reality to a punctual present leaves us with the void and thus purely abstract picture of a temporally extension-less hypersurface of the universe.
The Logical 'Inexistence' of Temporality
Grünbaum's resolution of Zeno's paradoxes demonstrates that the physical notion of time in effect has never been about temporality. Physics ever since has adopted an atemporal notion of time 4 . In addition, the concept of temporality was criticized from another point of view. It did not pass without notice that the definition of time given by the usage of tenses and temporal adverbs in language lacks consistency. What is implied in this usage is the definition of the now as something continuously moving relative to all datable, i.e., chronologically fixed, points in time. When we look at the now as being in relative motion there are two options equally odd. First we may consider the now as standing still and the datable points as moving. This movement of all chronology is a strange idea as such. The totality of states of the universe would have to be in ceaseless movement. Not only what is yet future, all the past, too, would have to be in motion. This universal motion is at variance, to say the least, with the changelessness of the past. The second view of relative motion is to consider the now as moving and the datable points as in rest. According to that view, the now propagates like a wave front through the ocean of world states. When the states of the world are in rest, however, nothing is objectively in motion. The moving now, then, is a subjective impression to which nothing except itself is corresponding.
Although this is a somewhat pictorial argument, the dilemma appears with logical strength when we look at the truth value of sentences containing tensed expressions. The sentence "yesterday was Sunday" is true today, Monday, and was false yesterday. The sentence "now it is night" is true tonight and will be false tomorrow morning. The truth value of the predicates "is present", "is past", "is future" changes with time. This change is accomplished by the changing position of the now relative to the once and forever fixed chronology of world states. The now is an indexical expression as is the "here" and are the personal pronouns. The truth value of sentences containing "here", "there", "I", "you" may change in time, too. This change, however, is manageable by modal logic, since the truth value of such sentences does not change if the speaker does not move from the original place of utterance or if nobody else but the original speaker utters the sentence. In contrast, the truth value of sentences with "now" and "then" changes without further ado. It changes spontaneously and irresistibly by the spontaneous and irresistible movement of the now relative to all datable points of time.
Sentences with spontaneously changing truth values are without prospects of scientific approval. On this basis temporality was criticized by Bertrand Russell [3] as early as in 1903. Russell's critique focused on the notion of past, present, and future as properties of moments, states, events, etc. He re-described these properties as concealed relations. An event is past when it happened before the utterance referring to it, it is future when it will happen after this utterance, it is present when it happens simultaneously with the utterance. As far as time goes, the truth of a tensed statement depends on how much earlier or later it is made in relation to its content. In this way, tensed expressions are 'token-reflexive', i.e., bound to the individual specimen of their utterance. Russell suggested to dispense with tenses by replacing them through expressions that relate the moment, event, fact, etc. referred to in explicit terms to the date of the referring utterance. "Now it is night" would then read "At July 5 th , 1993, 11 p.m. it is night", the statement "Yesterday was Sunday" would read "The day before July 5 th , 1993, is Sunday". Sentences like these have stable truth values. An event that happened before another event will always be earlier; an event that happened after another one will forever be later. Thus, replacement of tenses by relational determinations like 'earlier than', 'simultaneous with', and 'later than' disposes of the problems of unstable truth values.
Russell's remedy is deficient in two respects, however. First, the statement "At as expressed by the relations 'earlier than', 'simultaneous with', and 'later than', and (C) the mathematical definition of time as a linear continuum of instants. For brevity, the temporal order is denoted as the A series, the relational order as the B series, the continuum of datable points as the C series. The C series is atemporal and only nominally distinct from a further spatial dimension. The B series is atemporal, too, as long as there is no further reference to something that passes. By the relations of 'earlier than', 'simultaneous with', and 'later than' the totality of world states is ordered once and forever 6 . Nothing is changed by the 5 The proof is restituted and amplified by annotations and rejoinders to replies to its first publication in McTaggart [5] , ch. 33. passage of time. A state that is earlier than another one at any time will stay earlier forever, a state that is at any time later than another one was and will be always later. With the passage of time only the A series changes. What today is future may be present tomorrow and past the day after tomorrow. This change is accomplished by nothing else but the shifting now. It is this shift that essentially distinguishes time from space. This shift, McTaggart contends to proof, cannot be something real.
McTaggart's proof proceeds in two steps. First, he shows that the A series and the C series are fundamental, whereas the B series, being a mixture of both, is This apparently simple argument turned out to be of explosive power. For, as easily as the incompatible predicates seem to be made compatible, so notoriously incompatibility recurs. Of course we may translate back into the A series by saying that an instant that is present was future and will be past. But, by saying this, we tacitly introduce a second level of temporalization. To say that an instant was future means that the instants when it is future are past. To say that an instant will be past means that the instants when it is past are future. This reiteration of temporalization amounts to attaching secondary temporal predicates to the primary ones. Inclusion of these secondary predicates now renders nine instead of three predicates. All of these can be predicated to one and the same instant. One and the same instant can be 1. in the future yet future, 2. in the future present, 3. in the future past, 4. presently future, 5. presently present, 6. presently past, 7. in the past future, 8. in the past present, and 9. in the past already past. These nine predicates are incompatible again. Resolution of this reentrant contradiction needs the introduction of a third level of instants from which the second level predication is correct. Inclusion of these third level properties renders 27 predicates, which are incompatible in turn and so on ad infinitum. Each time we translate back into the A series the contradiction vanishes, each time we re-translate into the B series it recurs. This is not a sophism but a sophisticated formulation of the bewildering observation that a distinct and unique temporal order, encompassing the whole past and future, belongs to each single instant. With each moment, something present becomes past, and everything having been already past becomes more past. In the same way, each moment something future becomes present, and everything remaining future becomes less future. Each moment the map of all temporality is subject to redesign. McTaggart's proof gives formal expression of the fact that each of these redesigned maps shows different temporal 'colouring' whereas the chronological map of temporary world states remains fixed (at least as long as the same observer is concerned). Both maps, however, do not display different landscapes. The moments that they depict are the same. Yet, the different temporal maps show different properties of one and the same moment.
There are maps that show this same moment past, there is (at least) one map that shows it present, and there are other maps that show it future. This multitude of different maps, however, collapses into one and the same chronological map when projected onto the one-dimensional axis of time. This projection is -or at least seems to be -neutral with respect to temporal properties. Nothing that is past or present or future can be made non-past, non-present, non-future, respectively, by mere projection. Thus, the moments keep their presence, pastness, and futurity as elements of the chronological axis. This leads to the contradiction exposed by McTaggart. It can be evaded only by projecting these properties back into the temporal space where they appear in due sequence. By this projection, however, the point could be settled only if the space projected into would be definable in a consistent way. This space is spanned by adding, so to say, a perpendicular temporal axis to the chronological one. The existence of such an axis contradicts the one-dimensionality of time. If resort to higher dimensions is not viable the contradiction arises inevitably. Thus, the nonexistence of higher dimensions of time implies that temporal properties cannot be defined without contradiction. Without temporal properties, however, time is the space-like axis containing the chronological once-and-forever order of states.
Time, as we perceive it, becomes logically inconceivable. What is logically inconceivable cannot really exist. Thus, in spite of the strength of its challenge and notwithstanding continuing trials of rejection 7 , McTaggart's proof awaits conclusive refutation until now 8 .
It was Kurt Gödel [14] who brought McTaggart's argument into contact with relativity theory. If time consists of the series of nows, only one instantaneous 'time slice' of the universe exists at a moment. Various time slices of this kind, so the moral of McTaggart's proof, cannot co-exist since they bear temporal properties that contradict each other. The very same instant that is yet future in one slice is present in the next and past in the following one. Co-existence of the various slices in effect means that this same moment is as well past as present and future. Nevertheless, in classical terms, the present now and its mapping to past and future are one and the same for various subjects. The now is objective at least in the sense that subjects agree on its intersubjective identity. Even this identity, Gödel reminds, dissolves when simultaneity becomes relative to the location of the observer. The time slices, then, cannot be considered in an intersubjectively unequivocal way. Each observer has his own slice. Since bodily distinct observers are prevented from occupying spatially coinciding locations (at the same time), the time slices of different observers are separated, too.
Difference in spatial location means difference in the instantaneous time slice.
Temporality thus, so Gödel argues, lacks objectivity even in the weak sense of intersubjective agreeability. It leaves us with a picture of a universe consisting of as many worlds as there are conscious beings observing this universe from their respective here and now.
The Duality of Time
Since it is logically true that inconsistent concepts cannot denote something real, it seems logically unavoidable to negate the reality of temporality as expressed by McTaggart's A series. Accordingly, a number of theorists felt obliged to 7 For a summary of various views as to how to reject McTaggart's reasoning see Gale [6] , pp. 70-85. 8 For reconstructions of McTaggart's proof see Broad [7] , Dummett [8] , Schlesinger [9] - [11] , Mellor [12] , and Zeilicovici [13] . The clock time being is the clock time being now. Thus, by his theoretical faith Gödel was not dissuaded form wearing a watch; nor was McTaggart safely prevented from suffering from deadlines. Even Einstein lived as if the past was gone and as if the future was yet to come.
It may be felt that these practical arguments are not quite the point in case yet.
Einstein himself underlined the tenacity of the temporal illusion 9 . Moreover, an illusion is something real for its possessor (or the mind possessed by it). An indication for the 'reality' of illusions is how hard it is to get rid of them. Like hallucinations, illusions are apt to present themselves with subjectively overwhelming onset. There are even cases in which it is impossible to tell purely subjective impressions from veridical perceptions. For instance, however strong I may contend that colour is nothing but electromagnetic oscillation, I do not see photons nor wavelengths but qualities: red, blue, green. Knowing that temperature is molecular motion does not prevent me from feeling warmth as that homely quality. Irrespective of the illusiveness of the qualities thus appearing, the generation of the impressions -or 'qualia', as they are denoted -is real as far as the activity providing them is regarded. The making of illusions, like that of qualia, is real in the sense that an inner process resists suppression to imperceptibility. Could it suffice to concede this mind-dependent kind of reality to the moving now in order to save the faith in its objective unreality?
A clear indication of the mind-dependence of the now is the fact that nothing corresponding to it can be measured in the material world. Nowness, in Atmanspacher's parlance 10 , is no exofact. It is something we have notion of byand possibly only by -participation. Participating in nowness, as far as we experience it concretely, is synonymous with being aware. It is not without reason that 'presence' and 'awareness' share a good deal of meaning. There is no nowness when we are dreamlessly asleep or otherwise unconscious, as there are neither redness nor warmth in the sense of qualia. Moreover, I cannot know of the nowness as you experience it. Of course, there are psychological experiments concerning the duration of the now and the impression of its shifting. But these psychological experiments, too, rely on subjective reports of test persons. We are assuming as a matter of course that your nowness feels like mine, as we suppose that your sensations of redness and warmth feel like mine. But we cannot prove the supposed congruence since there is no reliable way of veri-or falsification.
We simply have no access to the sensations of the other. We can only agree in denoting the sensation that our neural machinery presents us when processing oscillations in the 600-800 nanometer range as red, as we can agree in denoting the sensation that results from processing molecular pressure above a certain degree as warm 11 .
Obviously, we also agree upon the clock time being now. Relativistic subtleties notwithstanding, this agreement is factual in all practical situations. By being factual it even provides a strong argument for the now being in fact extended. If the now were absolutely instantaneous, i.e., confined to a mathematical point in clock time, bodily distinct subjects never could agree upon its incidence. Each subject, then, would be condemned to inhabit solipsistically one of the worlds of an Everett-like multiverse. By its very existence, sociality suggests that there is, at least in the domain of present awareness, room for the now to be extended.
Synchronicity of several nows in the span of subjective awareness does not, however, preclude the hypothetical multitude of worlds as stipulated by the theoretical possibility of narrowing nowness arbitrarily. Since awareness is accessible only from within, the world as it is concretely perceived and imagined is in fact as manifold as there are individual instances of awareness. These worlds are 'window-less' in the sense Leibniz conceived of them in his monadology. Being inaccessible from outside the actuality of awareness renders as many worlds as there are conscious beings occupying their centres consisting 11 By this agreement we can detect, e.g., colour blindness as an anomaly. Positively, this agreement provides us with a means to gauge the semantics of qalia sufficiently well for practical purposes. Wittgenstein's denial of the possibilty of private languages is grounded on the fact that this is the only means of gauging. Putnam's [15] critique of mechanistic theories of meaning is based on the same footing.
in hereness and nowness.
The monads, however, may get limited access to one another if there is a time window sufficiently broad to make the individual nows overlap. Of course, this opening of a time window gives no immediate access to alien consciousness, but it gives way for communication. By simply supposing that my partner is a sentient being like myself, I can interpret her or his expressive behavior as a report about the apparition of her or his world. Of course, this supposition may be illusory again. It is quite conceivable that I am deceived by an automaton that only mimics human behavior (e.g. in a Turing test 12 ). Yet, there are very good practical -let alone intuitive -reasons to believe that consciousness is operative whenever it makes sense. In these cases we have access to other minds. Further, we are entitled to call nowness something objective in spite of its minddependence. The now is objective, then, in that we can agree intersubjectively upon its incidence and hence upon its actuality without proviso.
Are we approaching a reconciliation of physical time and temporality at this point? There are, to be sure, strong arguments favoring this temporalized version of Leibnizian monadology. On the one hand, it seems to provide a viable way of tackling the relativistic objections to nowness, on the other hand it allows temporality to be perceived as we subjectively perceive it and as we are socially obliged to treat it. Thus, it would be of great comfort if it were sufficient to make the endo-and the exo-view of time compatible. Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, it is not. The resulting problem concerns the interface connecting the endo-and the exoworld. Since any interface shares in both sides, a reconciliation has also to consider the options physics provides in this respect. There remains, to be specific, the quest for an independent explanation of the synchronicity of the individual nows. Second, an account for the intrinsic temporality of the interface is needed.
Why should subjectively different nows, however extended, overlap at all?
Why do all aware beings, old and young, use the same time window? Why are we collectively chained to the same now? What is it that selects this moment?
Why are we all walking in the same step through the states of the world? What is it that sets the pace? Why are the truth values of tensed sentences changing for 12 It is even conceivable that humans that deny the mechanically irreproducable quality of awareness are automata in this respect. Hans Moravec, are you serious? us all in the same way? What is it that drives this logical clock? If subjectivity alone was accountable for these accomplishments, physics would have to totally revise its account for subjective powers. It would amount to a miracle if awareness could accomplish this magnificent overall co-ordination by nothing but its own means. How do its individual instances inform each other as to the selection of the moment being now? How do they come to terms concerning its speed of shift? Or is awareness perhaps one whole? 13 Intersubjective synchronicity is but one aspect of nowness. Another one is its Obviously we lack this ability. Even if four-dimensional perception were possible, however, observation of more than the particular sector that consciousness has the capacity to overlook at a time requires relocation of its ramification. Only god-like perception could contemplate the universe as one whole without shifting the window of appearance. If such a shift is occurring, however, it has to be perceived in its own turn for enabling the observer to distinguish between rest and motion on the part of the scene observed 14 .
Perception of rest and motion on the part of the observed depends on selfperception of the auto-motion that the observing system is subject to. Conscious observation is inseparably bound to time perception.
Time perception is awareness of the auto-motion of the time window. To this auto-motion no movement in the outer world seems to correspond. Nothing material, no state of the outer world has to change with the relocation of the time window. No change other than that of the moment passing the window is implied with necessity. In this respect it seems quite natural to treat time perception and the perception of qualia alike. Impressions to which no outer 13 As, e.g. Schrödinger [18] speculated. 14 This corresponds to what Rössler [17] describes as Boscovich covariance of the process of observation and the processes observed. counterpart corresponds are purely subjective. This equal treatment of time perception and perception of sensual qualities overlooks, however, one striking difference. Time perception is, by its own activity, sharing the property perceived. Whereas the perception of color and warmth does not need to be correspondingly colored or tempered, the perception of temporal change needs temporally changing perceptions. This correspondence of perception and the property perceived is peculiar to time 15 .
Time perception is intrinsically temporal. It actualizes temporal change not only on the part perceived but also on the part of its own history as perceptive activity. Abstraction of temporality from time perception would neglect the object and the occurrence of perception alike. Thus, atemporal concepts of time cannot be based on perception at all. They are products of abstract thought. Of course, a world free of qualia is a product of abstract thought as well. But this abstraction neglects subjective impressions. It restricts itself to the physical counterparts of subjective phenomena. If, however, temporality were abstracted from time perception, no physical counterpart would be left. Subjective awareness is, as far as we know, the only manifestation of the passage of time.
Nevertheless, there must be something 'non-subjective' corresponding to it however deep it may be concealed. Assuming that its manifestation has no physical counterpart whatsoever, resort to something 'supernatural' would be unavoidable. A 'meta'-physical principle would be necessary to explain why the access of consciousness to reality is confined to the section of the time window. A mysterious force, not manifesting itself physically, would have to run the logical clock of tense. It would be only in consciousness that we are condemned to live through our bodily states, one after another, and to die some day in the future.
This metaphysical picture fits well into Leibnizian monadology. The monads, as souls, cannot simply cease to exist. They persist in the state of death, as they pre-exist in the state of not yet being brought into their world. They make 15 Cf. Mellor [12] , p. 8. Dennett and Kinsbourne [19] object to this view on the basis that there are temporal divergences between the outer application of a stimulus and its conscious perception. The posibility of time-consuming interpretations and rearrangements of stimuli before they become conscious, however, is merely an indication of the projective nature of the conscious now (see sec. 4 below). Time perception is not perception of the sequence of stimuli but awareness of the spontaneous auto-movement of the time window. Avoiding reference to the now, Dennett and Kinsbourne are unable to distinguish between perception of succession and time perception. appearance in life by awaking consciousness. They die, but do not disappear, by its extinction. The world each monad lives in is extended only by its own conscious activity. In the state of death this world has no extension. Dead (or transmigrant) souls are 'metaphysical points' [20] . Being extended by active perception, recollection and expectation, this world consists of the virtual reality of qualia. Appearance and outline of the monadic world is conditioned by the individual capacity of consciousness. Because of its limited capacity, human consciousness can comprehend only one state of the universe at a time. Since there is no physical mechanism ('influxus physicus') as to the selection of the state presented, this selection has to be pre-established by some metaphysical principle harmonizing the presentations to the monads between them. This 'preestablished harmony' is what temporality amounts to if there is no physical selection principle. Since God, the supreme monad, is omniscient, He is not subject to this principle. To Him the universe appears in its totality of states. For This interpretation of the dual geometries, implied in the physical notion of space and time, strongly suggests that Einstein's and Grünbaum's verdicts of temporality need modification. It even seems no longer precluded that there is an account of temporality within physics itself. In physics, however, there will be no account of anything that resists consistent definition. The dual geometries furnish only one of several conditions necessary for an account of temporality.
Two further ones are that the extension of the present can be conceived in a consistent way and that McTaggart's paradox can conclusively be rejected. We shall address these problems in the following.
The Geometry of Tense
The time window of perceptive awareness cannot be narrowed down to the extensionless cleft that the non-presence of past and future seems to claim.
Reduction of nowness to exact punctuality would close the window as such. The now must be extended, as it is in fact perceived. If, on the one hand, the now has to be extended, and, on the other hand, nowness cannot contain what is already past and what is yet just to come, time would have to be discrete. This may, as Ruhnau and Pöppel [25] have shown, in a certain sense be the case 16 . But the order of magnitude in this case is different from that of the duration of the now.
The now lasts up to three seconds. Time would have to be discretized on this scale. Within this duration the distinction of past, present, and future would have to be precluded. By this preclusion, however, the time window would be compelled to progress leap-wise every three seconds. Since the edges of the time window are blurred such as those of the visual field, it may well be that it progresses step-wise in a pace of about 30 msec [2, 25] . A leap-wise progression in the order of three seconds, however, contradicts not only introspective but also experimental evidence.
How can the time window be extended without contradiction? Being liable (1) to be extended, (2) to shift quasicontinuously, and (3) to contain no other than unequivocally present sections becomes a paradoxical request if extension is possible in but one dimension. The task, on the other hand, would be patently performable if a second dimension were available. Since it is obvious that there is some recording and recollection of the states exhibited by the time window, the assumption of a dimension used for handling projection should not be considered too exotic. Recollection does not mean time travel back to the event remembered, and anticipation does not mean leaping forward to the date concerned. Both recollection and anticipation are genuine projections. Thus, if for present consciousness there is a screen accessible for projecting what is not present, why then should the just-already-past and the just-yet-future not be projected onto this -virtual -screen, too?
Extension of nowness in this virtual dimension could easily account for 16 For synchronizing sensory input from different modalities there must be certain 'adirectional' temporal zones in the brain.
commonly reported intrasubjective differences regarding the duration of the now. There are numerous reports as to the now becoming dilated in moments of shock or of great pain up to the impression that time comes to a halt. If the time window opens in a virtual dimension it becomes a question of effort or of otherwise mobilized energy how far it widens. It widens by relative retardation of the rear as compared to the propagation of the front edge. Mobilization of additional resources urging the projecting activity may then suffice to slow down the movement of the rear edge up to a momentary halt. By this mobilization the seconds of bursting pain in the dentist's chair or the moment between the 'point of no return' and the crash in an accident may grow to apparent infinity 17 . If the supply of energy to the projective activity decreases with age, a general narrowing of the time window is to be expected as a function of aging. Narrowing the time window may also give rise to the feeling of acceleration of its shift. The feeling that time flows faster with increasing age is commonly reported.
As it seems, there is even experimental evidence for the projective nature of the duration of the now. Libet [27, 28] The screen, however, is displaying more instants than the one representing its instantaneous state. It is even conceivable that the date localizing this state in the chronological order of world states is not contained in the section the screen 17 It is even possible to simulate this widening of the time window in machine vision by programs equipped with appropriate dating systems; cf. [29] . By this method the resources needed may be estimated, too.
displays. In spite of ante-dating, there may be a certain lag between the process of presentation and the process presented. There may be even an extrapolative dislocation forward, which might account for our astonishing ability of intuitive precision timing [30] . There may be even an interplay of extrapolative projection and ex-post realignment whose extent depends only on the capacity of the neural machinery furnishing the screen [29] . However this may be in detail, perceived time resembles much more a two-dimensional package of states displaying temporally different events than a one-dimensional continuum of instants.
Each of these states displays instants -of, say, 30 ms length -that are also displayed by other states. One and the same instant is displayed by different states in a way that attributes slightly different temporal properties to it. The states themselves are different not only in that they have different dates of occurrence in the chronological order, they are also different in that they present the instants they display from a unique perspective. Time perception is awareness of this spontaneously ongoing change of perspective. In order to describe this change consistently, a degree of freedom additional to that allowed by the chronological axis has to be introduced 18 . If the sequential order of the states exhibited by the time screen has to be described as a part of the chronological order of world states, it has to be accounted for as a subset extending in more than one dimension of time.
The secondary dimension, however, is virtual. In a sense, the instants appearing on the screen whose date is not identical with that of the state of the In order to pass to geometry (II) on this phenomenological level this abstraction has to be 'inverted'. Instead of abstracting from the axis containing the instantaneous nows in which the concretely imagined virtual axis is centered, all virtual parts of the time screen have to be disregarded. This abstraction reduces time to the sequence of instantaneous nows that time perception as activity runs through. It may well be that the sequence of these instants is not continuous but discrete 19 . Since no physical account of nowness is available at present [22] , we can only speculate about the properties of this axis.
One of these speculations is the assumption that the axis of the instants the activity of time perception runs through is orthogonal to the imaginary one.
Here again, the phenomenological notions of the real and the imaginary axis would correspond to their mathematical counterparts. McTaggart proof is an elaborated version of Heraclitus' dictum "Into the same rivers we step and do not step, we are the same and we are not". What Heraclitus attributes to humans and rivers, McTaggart attributes to time itself. Since time changes whereas the moments, states, events, etc. occurring in it do not, everything occurring in time is in fact future, present, and past. There is no way out in saying that the issue in question was future, is present, and will be past. This translation back into the A series only means to attribute further temporal properties to the same issue. This same issue then is as future yet future, as future present, as future past, as present future, and so on. McTaggart's proof is perfectly correct if temporal differences cannot be accounted for as differences conditioned by perspective.
Of course, there is no perspective without at least a second dimension. What
McTaggart in fact demonstrates is that it is impossible to account for temporality within a strictly one-dimensional concept of time. Once this is seen the verification is straightforward. To say that something is future or past means to say that it does not exist now. What does not exist now does not really exist. If futurity and pastness are real properties of real moments, states, events, etc., their predication comes up to maintain that the same issue does exist and does not exist. We all know that this contradiction does not prevent us from consistently talking about future and past. The reason is that we all know that something not present can be presently presented in imagination. The first date concerns the moment, event, fact etc. referred to, the second date concerns the speech act that refers. Russell even would have forestalled McTaggart's paradox if he had not treated both dates as fixed. The date of the speech act refers is the date of the 'possibility locus' of predication. This possibility locus is the moving now. Thus, the dating vector of the speech act contains one stable co-ordinate and one that is subject to spontaneous change.
Nothing but this instability has to be accounted for to render the translation back and forth between the A series and the C series unproblematic. This mindful translation leaves semantics (as far as time goes) unchanged. Of course, semantics can only account for this instability. The spontaneous change of the possibility locus has to be explained independently.
Conclusion
The concept of time in its standard physical definition requires a strong principle of abstraction. One of the strongest principles of abstraction is the neglect of a whole dimension. The difference between the world that relativity theory describes and the world in which we consciously live is that the former abstracts from the real dimension of time. By this abstraction it arrives at a picture of the world as it is thought to be independent of this same thought. This elegant accomplishment of a seemingly paradoxical task, however, prevents physics from accounting for its own reality as conscious activity and history of thought.
In order to account for this reality it does not suffice to switch from geometry (I) to geometry (II). Transgression of a Gödelian borderline is needed. The world behind this borderline has more than one dimension of time.
